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Abstract: Combat command is an art. It derives its meager
intellectual roots from empirical science. There is great
current interest in grounding the subject of "command and
control" (C2) from a sounder, more comprehensive point of
view. This paper is intended to provide a general,
internally consistent structure within which most C2 may be
framed and analyzed. It departs from the usual approach by
insisting that tactical C2 can only be described and
analyzed in the context of combat itself. This research
draws from a theory of combat and imbeds the C2 functions,
processes, and supporting systems within the theory.
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The Mi I Itary Conf I let Institute has drafted a theory of combat
which will be distributed to Its membership but must always be
viewed as a I Ivlng body of work. This paper's foundation Is an
adaptation. But It Is as much the minds of key participants as
the written word that must be acknowledged, especially Donald S.
Marshal I
,
Lawrence J. Low, Edmund L. Dubois, Paul H. Moose, and
Trevor N. Dupuy.
Two command and control workshops sponsored Jointly by the Naval
Postgraduate School and the Military Operations Research Society
are the second source of Insight. Joel S. Lawson deserves
separate distinction for his broadening perspective.
Carl R. Jones and Peter Purdue of the Naval Postgraduate School
were cosponsors of the research, and Frank Shoup of OP-098 was
the off-campus sponsor.
A much more extensive set of acknowledgements could be prepared,
but It hardly seems fitting to record them until there Is an
Indication that this Is not Just another man's Inadequate attempt
to explain what we call command for combat.

COMMAND AND CONTROL WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF A THEORY OF COMBAT
A im and Scope
Development of a theory of command and control (and leadership In
the minds of some) is quite recent and still in flux. One
constraint on progress is the absence of a general theory of
combat, the matrix of command and control. Such a theory, under
development by The Military Conflict Institute, is far enough
along to draw from. Using that theory as the foundation it is the
purpose of this paper to fuse current work in command and control
into what is thought to be a se I f -cons i stent structure that is
robust enough to treat the subject universally and coherently.
A theory of combat is a structure for understanding the phenomena
of human beings in deadly competition. It is indirectly
Interested In "how to win battles", but Its aim Is descriptive,
not prescriptive. This work is limited to command and control
(C2) for combat: It treats the domain of tactics, which are the
handling of forces In battle. It is probably Inadequate for
other military operations and their logistics, and is
emphatically deficient in places regarding the role of C2 In
strategy and military policy. Nonetheless the scope is greater
than the activities of command during a battle (which might be
cal led combat direction)
,
because the command function
establ ishes Its Influence much earl ler.
Leadership is placed in context under the viewpoint that
leadership Is a human quality of someone I n command . I t w I I I be
seen that motivation is Included as a function of command. Thus
(1) a soldier ordered to charge the enemy must charge him or else
the C2 function has failed, and (2) good and bad leadership has
much to do with command effectiveness.
Often the emphasis in the study of C2 is on either the hardware,
the organization of humans and hardware into a system, or the
processes of C2 in the time domain independent of tactical
context or specific purpose of the commander. This work does not
neglect these more commonly treated aspects, but it is especial ly
interested in relating C2 to combat. For instance, we wi I I sever
the combat process of information gathering and give it status
separate from C2 , while at the same time insisting that one of
the major responsibilities of C2 Is to d I rect the reconnaissance
and surveillance effort, along with all other battlefield
activities of forces commanded.
The author Is Interested In the command and control problem both
as a combat modeler and as a tactician (emeritus). No explicit
analytical model appears In this paper, but the author has tested
the concepts with equations that are Internally consistent and
escape the straltjacket of attrition models with which we now
conduct combat analysis. In fact the equations came first In the
evolution. As a tactician the author will never have a chance to
put this work to use, a prospect he views with mixed feel I ngs
.
The Theory Structure: (1) Combat Potential and Power
The theoretical framework for this work la grounded In the
fundamental proposition that combat Is lethal f orce-on-f orce
activity ( force to be defined below).
We begin by postulating the existence of:
Forces : tangible entities which when activated by a
commander against an enemy wl I I produce combat power.
Designed combat potential: the designated or notional
capacity of a set of forces to achieve useful results In combat
when optimally organized, trained, equipped, supported,
motivated, and led according to the design of the forces.
Available combat potential: the actual capacity of the
forces to achieve useful results In combat with Its existing
organization, training, equipage, support, motivation, and
leadership. Measurement of combat potential presupposes a
characteristic or notional enemy and combat environment. AAW
batteries are Intended to be effective against aircraft, not




the real I zed capab I I I ty of the forces at any
instant of time to achieve results In combat In furtherence of a
mission against specific enemy forces In a specific environment.
Potential is a quantity drawn on to create combat power. Combat
power is a rate of effectiveness, but it does not follow that
potential Is consumed In the generation of combat power the way
electricity from a battery is consumed. Combat power Is
generated against an enemy by forces conducting act i v 1 1 1 es
ordered by a commander by means of a C2 process . It Is general
practice to associate a purpose, or mission, with the commander
and with command and control.
We wi I I now proceed to develop the above terms and the dynamics
associated with them.
Theory Structure: (2) Forces and their Functions
Forces are tangible things, or e I ements , used for fighting:
people and equipment. Every element has attributes which
collectively are referred to as its state. Forces are assembled
to perform one or more combat f unct i ons , which In the dynamic
sense are performed as activities. The generic functions and
the related activities of forces In combat are:
o Command I ng
o Contro I I I ng
o Information gathering
o Mov I ng
o Supplying
o F I re power de I I ver I ng
o Interfering with any of the enemy functions
These functions/activities can be described In detail, Including
quantitative detail, but functions by themselves should not be
thought of as producing combat results, because they are defined
Independently of a specific recipient: enemy target or friendly
bene f I c I ar y
.
Theory Structure: (3) Combat Processes
When activated In combat, an e I erne n t of forces performs specific
act I ons (consistent with Its functional attributes) which are
Intended to cause changes In the states of itself and other
friendly and enemy elements of forces. The e I ement-act I on-
e I ement triad Is an act I v I ty which has a resu I
t
that can, at
least In principle, be measured. A shooter fires a burst from
his weapon, depleting his magazine and achieving hits on his
target .
Collective activities by functioning forces are called combat
processes . The complex activity of firepower del Ivery (shooting,
roughly) creates the processes of attrition and suppression on
the enemy. Each process by one side has a countermeasur
e
available to the enemy side. Each process has an observable





o Attrition (destruction o Protection
or damage)
o Suppression o Covering
o Scouting (Information o Screening
acqu I s I t i on)
o Supply (or support) o Interdiction
o Maneuver (or motion) o Fixing (Including disruption)
o Command and control o Counter-C2 (Including
(Including communication) deception)
Theory Structure: (4) Force
Force Is the result of one side's collective activities (combined
as processes) and the other side's attenuating activities
(combined as countermeasures) . Firepower measured on a firing
range as hits per gun per minute will be altered by the enemy's
protective countermeasures. In combat both sides apply force, so
that fighting Is complex force-on- force activity.
We see that It Is conceptually Inadequate to measure (or
envision) combat results, from combat power alone, because of the
need to account for enemy counteractions and (a factor not yet
Introduced) other uncer ta I nt les . Activities (triads) In
practice are nearly always treated both analytically and
operationally as a collective Interaction of elements, their
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actions, and the resulting changes to the elements' states. The
collective act i v 1 1 1 es and their effects, are aggregated as
processes with collective, measurable results. A line of
shooters fire at an advancing I I ne of the enemy, which goes to
ground to reduce Its casualties. The hits achieved on the
shooters' targets are now small, and the primary result Is not to
attrit (though this may be the shooters' Intention) but to slow
or stop the enemy advance: pin down the enemy. The processes of
attrition and suppression occur concurrently, often with the most
notable result being suppression, which it should be emphasized,
Is a sal lent form of degradation of the enemy's force.
Theory Structure: (5) The General Equation of Combat Power
In the above example the combat power of the shooters is
synonomous with their fire power, and the force exerted by their
combat power stops the enemy advance. Let us Introduce the
fundamental equation of combat power:
"p
= F { m, u )
Combat power, P, Is a function of the attributes and number of
forces, m, which In our example are solely elements assigned to
shoot, and value of their act I v I ty . u
.
which is characterized by
the skill with which they fire (rate of fire and accuracy), the
terrain they cover and the range at which they open fire. The
commend function. F, governs the form of the equation (which
might be m x u) as we I I as its values (number of shooters,
terrain selected, open-fire range, etc.). A more complicated
combat power equation might have divided the forces Into shooters
and suppl lers running ammuntion to the shooters so that the fire
could be sustained indefinitely. Then the action of the support
elements is to maintain the readiness attribute of the shooter
elements in a state we might call "armed for combat".
Command explicitly determines the division of labor in its forces
between supporting and shooting. Command, in choosing the
ground, fields of fire, dispersion, and open fire range
determines the value of the activities it controls. Command
implicitly determines other aspects (states) imbedded in the
elements of Its forces such as shooting skills, survival skills
and cohes I veness , through organization, training, and doctrine.
Combat power is determined by the way in which command draws from
Its own combat potential in a battle. The resultant force
depends, however, on decisions on both sides. Combat is
Inherently force-on-f orce activity, In which the effects of two
opposing combat powers are simultaneously Imposed on each other.
Thus the command function Is always ooncerned with competitive
choices. This Is true even when one side cannot shoot back, as
with a antisubmarine aircraft against a submarine without AAW
armament. The submarine will try to evade in turn, detection,
localization, and attack by the aircraft. The tactics on both
sides are complex, but unique from the usual Image of a force-on-
force exchange of fire. The submarine generates zero combat
power against the aircraft, but seeks to survive by evasion. The
outcome of successful submarine countermeasur es is zero
attrition, but the aircraft's force is not zero because it
neutralizes (suppresses) the submarine during Its stalking
operations. The aim of forces which cannot attack is survival,
but survival against a Force takes activity under astute command.
Included Functions of Command and Control
The reason command and control have been difficult to deal with
Is that they are so mu I t I f aceted . The terms are concerned with:
o Organization o Motivation
o Decision o Execution
It is also possible to establish other categories of command
Influence, notably:
o education (which is associated not only with understanding
but Ideology, socialization, and cohesion)
o training (wich is associated not only with skills but with
Indoctrination and doctrine)
If the above four component functions of C2 are regarded as
comprehensive, then al I other categories must be treated as
contained within them. Training would be a functional
resonsibi I i ty of command accompl ished under any or al I of the
four sub-functions.
The command function Is hierarchical from "the national command
authority" all the way down to the Individual who commands and
controls only his own activities. It is also circular: sound
organization, motivation, decision, and execution reinforce both
within and across the sub-functions, and weakness in one has
debilitating feedback effects on the others. The dominant effects
of command and control can be as abstract as the influence of an
Institutional ethos and as concrete as the difference between
ordering and leading an assault.
We emphasize that command, control, and leadership all come In
good and bad flavors. It Is common, but dangerous, to refer to
good results coming from command or leadership when one means
sound command or good leadership. In general, theory of combat
deals with the effects of battlefield attributes both good and
bad (equipment, terrain, timing, surprise, and so forth). While
achieving better command or leadership Is a fundamental Issue,
that achievement Is, In the context of the theory, principally m
desirable end product. Theory must settle other matters first.
Some historians devote their effort to the study decisive
battles, and the qualities of good and bad leaders at the
extremes of the spectrum. As McQule [1988; p. 5] reoently
pointed out, the average ground battle from 260 oases consisted
of:
A division attacking a division
In a frontal attack against a fortified defense
with 17,700 men attacking 8,500
on an 8-kllometer front
In mild, dry weather
on ro I I I ng terra I n
with mixed cover
without surprise
with the attack producing a penetration
and the defense resulting In a withdrawal.
In many of those "normal" battles (fought according to the norm)
the qualities of leadership were splendid-- on both sides.
Theory must give the norm Its due. Historians are also wont to
Judge leadership as good or bad depending on good or bad battle
outcomes. Theory must discern cases in which the leadership was
sound, even exemplary, when the battle was lost. Contrariwise,
one must never leap to the conclusion that because the battle was
won the leader was talented. Theory is concerned, first and
foremost, with establishing what constitutes the C2 function, and
with advancing a framework within which the value of C2 can be
adjudged. Indeed, the development of good leaders is a massive
subject in itself, which can profit from theory of combat and the
aspects that deal with command, control, and leadership.
Although C2 affects all elements under Its command and their
actions, C2 Is not the actions of those elements except Insofar
as the elements belong to the C2 System (defined below) and the
actions are part of the C2 Process. The C2 process decides what
is needed from forces and transforms the need into action. The
C2 process should not be thought of as the combat actions
themselves. C2 governs "everything" In combat and Its study can
Involve any or every aspect of combat, but C2 Itself Is not
everything; "combat" la the expression for everything covered In
theory or practice.
In particular It is common practice to view Information gathering
(detection, classification, tracking, targeting, and damage
assessment) as part of the C2 function. This theory distinguishes
Information collection from C2 . It treats Information
Interpretation ("fusion") as part of the decision (I. e., C2)




or any other means, Is a distinct process with a measurable
result which C2 governs. Indeed, selecting and distributing
elements of forces for scouting Is one of the major, distinctive
responsibilities of modern command.
To say that C2 governs ever yth I ng , as we have above, is not quite
correct. It Is possible to envision activity that occurs on the
battlefield that has nothing to do with C2 or leadership. The
teat cannot be whether the activity was ordered by a properly
constituted command. Too many activities are "spontaneous", the
deeply Ingrained activities of Individuals that are traceable to
doctrine, self-command, or group cohesion. The test must be
whether the activity Is associated with mission accomplishment;
whether It contributes to the collective aim of the forces In the
battle. "Freezing up", getting lost, panic and a rush to the
rear are activities which, If they are connected with C2 at all,
are connected by a deficiency In It
Structure and Terminology
The military activity called command and control (C2) is both a
function and a process. The C2 function organizes, motivates,
decides, and directs the activities of forces. In the remainder
of the paper we will call the all encompassing f unct I on simply
command .
The C2 process alters the states (attributes) of forces. Usually
the alteration is to forces which are commanded . In the
remainder of the paper we wi I I refer to the C2 process as command





activity is pervasive in command and control activity
and, though not identical, must be treated as Inseparable.
Leadership is associated with that special set of elements, the
commanders . Leadership Is a quel I ty of a commander which causes
compliance with his desires (I. e., obedience plus the desired
degree of initiative). The result of strong leadership Is merely
behavior In conformance with what the leader wants. Thus, strong
leadership helps cause results, but strong leadership must be
accompanied by sound decisions to produce good results. It Is a
combination of strength and soundness that we cal I good
leadership. When a man not In the formal chain of command
asserts leadership In the sense herein (altering the attributes
of forces) then he Is exercising off-l I ne command and control .
The term leadership also connotes qualities In an Individual that
create (or destroy) morale and cohes I veness . it Is quickly seen
that leadership affects not merely motivation, but organization,
decision, execution, and notably In this Instance, training as
well. But neither the development of good leadership nor Its
characteristics ar& the subject of this worte.-
Combat Direction is a utilitarian term with fairly consistent
usage. In this document it will refer to the command and control
process on the field of battle. Thus It excludes (or downplays)
organizational and motivational aspects, and emphasizes the
decision process and sometimes execution.
Command and control as a process has come to Indicate an organic
unity and the interconnection will be retained In this chapter.
If a distinction must be made, for my purposes "Command decides
what is needed from forces and control transforms the need Into
action" [Hughes, 1986, p. 147]. Command Is closely associated
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with acts of decision; control Is closely associated with
execution of decisions made. In the etymology of "command and
control", an early usage (associated with safeguards against the
unauthorized release of nuclear weapons) denoted command as the
power to act and control as a contraint on action. JCS Pub 1
currently defines control as "authority which may be less than
full command over part of the activities of subordinate or other
organizations", which is an exceedingly non-descrlpt approach.
Whatever their virtues these views of control seem to have fallen
from common usage. We will reserve the term command and control
to stand for a process, and the word command by Itself to stand
for the all encompassing function discussed above. Contro
I
will,
because of diverse usage, blow In the wind, sometimes standing
for the function, sometimes the dynamic process of carrying out a
decision, and sometimes representing an aim to control the mind
or wi I I of a fr lend or enemy.
Command, Control and Communications (C3) and other expansions
such as CS I (I = Intelligence) have been used almost synonomously
with C2 as defined herein. Another usage coming to prominence
(see for example Sweet, Metersky, and Sovereign (rev. June 1986))
denotes C3 as the communications process or activity associated
with command and control. This usage Is encouraged. The term
C3 will rarely be necessary herein, because C2 connotes control
Including the means of control, namely communication of
dec I s I ons
.
A Command and Control System consists of a collection of
denotable things that are used to perform the C2 function:
physical elements (equipment such as transmitters and receivers,
computers, a signal book, status boards and other decision
support hardware, code breaking facilities, signal flags, etc.),
human elements (communicators, staffs, Intelligence analysts, the
commander himself, etc.), and procedural elements (table of
organization and command relationships, the content of a signal
book, the content of a manual of training or doctrine, etc.).
This collection of things Is presumed in most usage to be
integrated (actually form a system) in some sense. The purpose
of the C2 system is to facilitate the C2 process. In some usage
the commander himself Is excluded from the system, which is then
said to support him, but we will always ooncelve the commander to
be e component of every C2 system. In a squad the commander and
his voice may be the entire system. However primitive, there Is
always a C2 system, even when an isolated soldier directs
h imse I f
.
A C3 System Is not a term needed In this paper, but It oan be
defined, consistent with the term C3 , as the communications
elements and procedures that perform the C3 function.
[Some authorities would Identify three systems, namely physical
entities, structure, and the C2 process Itself. This is
cumbersome because physical entitles and structure are so closely




Moreover to work within this theory It Is necessary
for consistency to associate the C2 system with elements and C2
activities with results that alter the states of the elements.)
C2 Countermeasures (C2CM) are activities Intended to lessen the
effectiveness of the enemy's C2 . C2CM may destroy his C2
elements or change their states ("confuse the picture"). C2CM
may also Interfere with his activities (Jam his communications).
These activities are well categorized in many sources, except to
note that sometimes actions taken against his Information
collection are called C2CM and we regard this as Improper.
A C2 Countermeasures System Is a set of elements, I Ike a
communications Jammer and Its operator, that perform C2 counter-
measures .
C3 Countermeasures (again a term not needed In this psper) are
activities to lessen the effectiveness of the enemy's
communications, such as the aforementioned Jamming.
An alternative structure Is advanced by Snyder (1988 draft)
which has the merit of being tied to the agreed U. S. definition
of command and control found In the Department of Defense
Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (JCS Pub 1) . This
reads: "The exercise of authority and direction by a properly
designated commander over assigned forces In the accompl Ishment
of the mission. Command and control functions are performed
through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications,
facilities, and procedures which are employed by a commander In
planning, directing, coordinating and controlling forces and
operations In the accomplishment of the mission."
Snyder goes on to say "The first part-- 'The exercise of
authority and direction by a properly designated commander over
assigned forces In the accomplishment of the mission'-- will
serve as our definition of the command function. The middle part
of the DOD definition-- "an arrangement of personnel, equipment,
communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a
commander'-- will be used as our definition of a C3 system. C2
for our purposes will be defined (using the final words of the
DOD definition) as the process 'employed by a commander In
planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and
operation In the accomplishment of the mission.'
"[Thus] the term 'command' will be used to mean the funct I on to
be performed, the term 'C3' will stand for the supporting system ,
while the term 'command and control' will denote the process that
commanders employ ('In planning, directing, coordinating, and
controlling'), as they exercise authority and direction over
assigned forces."
We cannot accept the JCS/Snyder terminology because many C2
functions the Influence of which Is too prominent to disregard
are performed well before a combat mission Is known. The
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difficulty probably lies In a JCS emphasis on strategic "roles
and missions". But this is a theory of, combat. Activity away
from the scene of battle, even in peacetime, to prepare forces to
achieve their designed potential (we would say enhance their
attributes) by training, organization, establishment of doctrine,
and motivation may be the most Important functions of command.
The JCS definition above omits any mention at ail of command
responsibility to motivate forces. The JCS definition is very
similar to the term Combat Direction as we accept it.
In other respects there is great similarity. We denote "the
exercise of authority and direction [of forces)" as the command
f unct I on .
We denote "the arrangement of personne I , equ
I
pment , commun i cat I ons,
facilities, and procedures employed by a commander" as the C2
system .
And we denote "functions performed. . .and [processes] employed
by a commander" as Command and Control itself, or the C2 process .
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The Functions: A Discussion of "Command"
The command function takes cognizance over at I aspects of each
element of its forces. It governs ("exercises authority over")
them and prepares them for combat. In addition and most
important in the terminology of this theory of combat, it
activates them to create combat power for the composite actions
we call battle. Insofar as this theory of C2 is concerned, the
function of command for war in general is not specifically
addressed but Is presumed to be to direct forces to achieve
wartime goals. In this paper the C2 function is specifically to
distribute Force (as defined above) In time and space to
accompl Ish combat missions.
The JCS definition of C2 speaks of four sub-functions: planning,
directing, coordinating, and controlling forces. By defining
management to be Inherent In command, the JCS In effect add two
more sub-function, organizing and evaluating, to Its list. We
prefer the four command functions, organizing, motivating,
deciding, and executing, and regard them as necessary and
suf f I c I ent
.
By organ I z I ng Its forces, command arranges the elements,
establ Ishes I I nes of command and communications, and codifies
sound practice for united action, typically by formulating
tactical doctrine or fighting instructions. A subsequent course
of instruction in the Naval Postgraduate School curriculum for C3
students addresses organization in detail. Extensive literature
In Management Science treats theory of organization exhaustively,
but because its interest is in commerce and industry, the
I iterature must be adapted for mi I itary purposes. Organization
for combat is an art which has been finely honed empirically, and
the organizational wisdom of management science has probably
taken as much from the military experience as it has given in
return .
By mot I vat i ng Its forces, command prepares the elements to comply
with orders, both expl Iclt and Impl icit, and execute the
activities it desires under extreme conditions of violence. It
does this by encouragement, compulsion, enjolnder and drill.
Other techniques employed In the art and science of leadership
are Indoctrination and inspiration. Motivation is closely
associated with cohesion, achieved by such measures as the
inculcation of doctrine.
The effect of good organization and motivation Is to raise the
ava I I abl
e
combat potential of forces toward their des I gned
potential. In other words, the principal effect is to alter the
attributes (states) of the elements of forces and their
Interrelationships (structure). By definition, designed combat
potential means the maximum capacity of a force that can be
activated by a commander against a notional enemy. Available
potential will always be less. Available potential Is always a
multiplier of designed potential that lies between and 1. In
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the structure of this theory of combat there can never be a "C3
bonus" that elevates available potential above the designed
potential. Nevertheless the organizational and motivational
effect of command can be massive. A disorganized, badly
mot ivated battalion Mill have a mu I 1
1
p I I er c I ose to zero, say
0.1. A we I I I ed batta I I on wl I I have a multiplier cl ose to one,
say 0.8. Under those extreme circumstances, equal forces
expressed as an order of battle (Mill have an eight-fold
difference In actual potential that can be activated. Almost no
skill of command decision and execution on the field of battle
can redeem the deficiency of the unprepared battalion.
Many theories of C2 disregard organization and motivation and
leave them to organization theory and leadership studies. All,
however , treat the next two subf unct I ons , namely decision and
execution. Most associate themselves with understanding and
Improving combat direction-- sound decisions and more proficient
execu t i on
.
By dec i d i no, , command determines what activities its forces should
carry out. This function will be discussed further below, under
The Purpose of the C2 Process with regard to the aim of sound
combat decision making.
By execut i ng , command achieves compl lance among Its forces with
the decisions it has made. Execution Is concerned with accurate
communication of decisions and feedback to monitor compliance.
Rightly or wrongly, the greatest attention In current U. S. C2
theory is devoted to the study of effective execution under the
presumption that the decisions made were desirable.
Decision and execution are closely related because of the
competitive aspect of combat, that Is, the fact that both sides
want to decide and Implement their decisions In a way that Is
disadvantageous to the enemy. The C2 process confronts the
commander's dilemma: a valuable decision must be timely, but the
Information on which the decision Is based takes time to get.
The decision-execution function Is often studied with the well
known "Decision loop", discussed below under the C2 Process . The
decision-execution process, or C2 process, is closely I Inked to
t Ime I I ness
.
Commands are organized In such a way as to be able to think and
act with blocks of forces. Similarly analysis is conducted with
blocks of forces. This is because except at a very low level
neither the commander nor the analyst is able to monitor and
understand the Interactions of each element and the effect of the
actions on every other element. The question arises, what is the
lowest level of granularity that the commander, or analyst,
should concern himself with? An empirical rule of thumb Is that
he looks two echelons down. On what basis? The general answer
is this: the blocks of forces (team, squad, platoon, company,
battalion, brigade, etc.) should be the smallest grouping that
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command needs to be Informed about and control In order to
accomplish Its mission. Thus, a brigade commander In the heat of
battle cannot be concerned with success or failure of a squad,
except Insofar as that squad Is critical to the brigade's mission
success
.
This Is, of course, only a general answer. The whole art of
successful command and successful analysis Is closely related to
knowing which details are Important and when. The ability to
focus on important Information is referred to as "a directed
telescope" in Van Creveld [1985; pp. 75, 115, 142, 176, 255-257].
The Process: A Discussion of "Command and Control"
Command and Control is the process of activating organized and
trained forces (thus transforming combat potential Into combat
power), and synchronizing their activities. C2 decides and
causes decisions to be Implemented. Communication Is one
principal means of control. Two other means not to be overlooked
are doctrine and training. C2 causes (sometimes indirectly by
organization and motivation) all other processes to occur. In
fact It activates Itself, and synchronizes Its own C2 activities.
C2 is a cognitive process, in the sense that Its results alter
the state of knowledge, attitude or Intentions of human elements.
Reca I I I ng that the theory of combat defines elements and their
actions and that elements have attributes, the result of the C2
process is a change of state of the attributes of human elements.
The desired response to C2 by the human elements whose cognitive
state is altered is to carry out commands or orders, causing a
physical change of positions, a search plan, a field of fire, and
so forth.
Here is a simple example. A soldier at position (xO, yO) Is
ordered to new position (xl, y1). His mind now holds the new
Information that the desired state for him is not his present
state and he must decide how to act to go to the new position
(walk or crawl, use stealth or move swiftly), and indeed under
especially hazardous circumstances whether to move at all. Which
method he employs depends on another attribute, which Is the
soldier's motivation to go to the new position, and which at the
time of the order the superior cannot change, and so has a
constant value z. The soldier's state z is really a complex
vector of mental attributes the sum of which determine if and how
he will move to position (xl, yl). Under most circumstances, for
most combat simulations, and Indeed for most commanders ordering
a maneuver, both the soldier's compliance and some normal rate of
movement to the new position are taken for granted. But the laws
of human behavior are not like Newton's laws of motion for
Inanimate objects. The phenomenon (Information and Instructions
to alter a cognitive state) required to cause a human being to
climb a hill Is different from the phenomenon (the potential
energy of gravity) required to roll a truck down a hill. If the
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world of physical science Is composed of matter and energy, and
the world of I Ivlng organisms Is composed of matter, energy and
Information, then the world of man Is composed of matter, energy,
Information, and Instructions.
The C2 System (discussed above and below) are physical elements,
both human and material, that facilitate transfer of knowledge
and change the cognitive states of other elements.
Symbol ical ly the role played by C2 in the general combat power
equation is as the functional operator, F, that maps forces, m,
and their activities, u, into the space of possible states of
combat power, P, available.
P = F [ m, u ]
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The C2 process Is often studied with a decision cycle. One form
by Lawson and Moose is exhibited in Figure 1. For a summary of






In this cycle the commander observes the state of the environment
and then attempts to alter It by bringing It In conformance with
a plan which specifies a desired end state, or a series of
Intermediate, time dependent states. The cycle Is completely
general and works at any level. The example above of a single
soldier conforms with the cycle: he compares a new desired stete
(position x1, y1) with his existing state and makes a decision,
directing his own actions. The decision cycle Is studied In the
time domain, and a common measure of effectiveness is the time
taken to change the environment to conform with the plan. Great
thought has been given In C2 analysis to ways to shorten the
eye I e
.
Observe that elements of both the enemy's and one's own forces
are part of the "environment". Orders executed by one's own
forces are in fact the principal way of changing the environment.
Also, sometimes It Is possible to Influence enemy forces by whet
Soviet theory calls reflexive control, or C2CM as the term Is
used In this theory.
C2 gives orders to sensing elements (radar, EW listening posts,
search aircraft, reconnaissance parties, picket lines, etc.) to
improve knowledge of the environment. C2 also gives orders to
Itself, to move, take cover, Inspect the front, etc. The
decision cycle has the power to look outside of the C2 process
Itself at the linkage between C2 and all the other combat
processes. It makes possible the study of C2's effect on the
activities of firepower del Ivered, or on the rate or qual I ty
(tactical significance) of reconnaissance and surveillance
Information, or on the proficiency of logistics support. With
the decision cycle it is possible to examine the tactical context
and "productivity" of a command decision, observing in detail the
steps Involved in the delivery of firepower, In search, in C2 , or
In countermeasures against the enemy. [See Hughes; 1986, pp 186-
187] .
On the rare occasion when the decision cycle can be analyzed
without particular concern with what the enemy Is doing, the
theory of cybernetics can be drawn upon and the cycle visual Ized
as a feedback loop. It is dangerous to draw from engineering
control theory, however, because combat is a two sided process,
In which the enemy Is simultaneously trying to Influence the
environment at cross purposes with the friendly commander. The
situation may be likened to trying to use a automatic feedwater
regulator to sense the level In a boiler and keep the water at a
certain height, but with a second operator present who wants to
alter the level to suit his own perverse purpose.
The decision cycle Is a major analytical tool used to study the
execution phase of the C2 process. But observe that the decision
cycle by itself presumes a command decision or set of decisions,
Including the Initial operation order ("desired state"). Absent
a separate mechanism for determining what decision should be
made, the decision cycle Is content free. A decision cycle does
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not examine the "what and why" of command and control but merely
the "how and when" of It.
Therefore let us look at the decision process. It has some long
standing tools. The one with the longest pedigree Is some form
of the well known "estimate of the situation", which oauses the
commander and his staff to array his relevant choices against
those of the enemy and to choose the one that fulfills the
mission with the least risk. Game theory Is similar, but
quantifies the payoffs of the choice pairs and Introduces the
posslbllllty of "mixed strategies." Both of these methods pay
due attention to the enemy. One of their weaknesses Is that the
time dimension and the whole aspect of battle dynamics cannot be
easily built Into these tools of decision.
The estimate of the situation and game theory fall under the
science called In general Decision Theory. For the military C2
theorist a grounding In decision theory has obvious advantages,
but he must move quickly beyond It Into the particulars of his
own domain. Decision theory usually resorts to some mechanism
for optimization which, when applied to battlefield problems,
loses much of Its power because of Incomplete Information, the
difficulty of describing complex choices and responses with
quanltative values (utilities), and other factors hard to capture
i n a forma I i sm.
The wisest practice seems to be to maintain the bond between
decision and execution represented by the term "command and
control", so that the essence of sound decision and timely
implementation cannot be separated.
Modern battlefield decision aids seem to keep the bond in place
instinctively. It is fashionable (and wise) to express suspicion
of tools of mathematics or logic at the same time that their use
Is (also wisely) mushrooming. We use automatic routing systems
to move signals from sender to recipient. We use search and
screening theory to deploy scouts and screens. We have Imbedded
target selection criteria In at least one of our most
sophisticated AAW missile systems. The Soviet view favors
decision aids not only to save time but also to exploit the
wisdom of the best minds in a cooler atmosphere off the
battlefield. All of the above examples include, indeed
emphasize, the dynamics of the situation. It Is hard to think of
a utilitarian decision aid that Is Indifferent to time and
timeliness. In the U. S. Navy the offloe of "aide" was
orlgnlnally spelled "aid", up to and including the Secretary of
the Navy's own principal adviser, the Aid for Operations.
Whether one Is describing the process carried out by a Decision
Aid or a human staff assistant, the bond between decision and
execution embodied In both kinds of aids seems to marry the two
functions In a continuum of process.
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A C2 System and Its Constituents
In this theory a C2 system is a set of elements intended to work
together to carry out the the C2 process. They comprise physical
elements, human elements, and procedural elements which together
permit C2 activities to take place. Examples of these components
are:
o Physical elements: radio transmitters and receivers,
computers, signal lamps, laser signal equipment, signal flags,
an underwater telephone, a communications satellite or
communications relay ground station or aircraft, an airborne
command post, a flagship, or the flag facilities In a warship,
the tank In which an armored commander Is riding, status boards
and other decision support hardware, encrypting and decrypting
hardware, a code book, or a one-time coding pad.
o Human elements: radio operators, staffs, Intelligence
analysts who Interpret Information for command, status board
keepers, manipulators of decision aids, and the commander
h Imse I f
.
o Procedural elements: the contents of a table of
organization, doctrinal publications, operation orders, a
training manual, and Instructions for the use of a decision aid.
A three-element system capable of performing the command
function is a commander, an operation order, and a subordinate
commander. When the commander hands the operation order to the
subordinate and says "Learn this," the function of command is
being performed, and the process of commanding can be measured by
the degree to which the subordinate grasps what is in the
oporder . The actions by the subordinate receiving the order to
"learn this" and then studying it can be viewed as a single
activity or two; the viewpoint depends on whether breaking the
activity in to two pieces is relevant. In fact the commander will
usually distribute to his several subordinates the operation
order which contains directions to "execute this" and assume
receipt, understanding, and action all of a piece. But no system
can be studied or evaluated except with respect to some dynamic
process
A two element system with aggregated components of C2 might be
A. a command headquarters comprised of commander and staff
(organization and motivation Implied) and physical elements (like
radios) to receive and transmit Information, and B. a soldier
with a radio who Is capable of shooting at something. Is the C2
process completed when A's order to B to shoot Is del Ivered? If
communications reliability Is under study, then the act of B
shooting Is regarded as separate and not part of the C2 process.
On the other hand command effectiveness may be the Issue. Then
the C2 process must be measured by the whether the soldier shoots
(whether the C2 process triggers the desired action), and
sometimes by whether the soldier hits a target. The usual study
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of a C2 system focuses on transfer of data, so that del Ivery of
an order Is the terminus, but since command governs all, the full
measure of command effectiveness Is combat effectiveness.
Never the I ess .the system we have been discussing is simply element
A and el ement B
.
The Purpose of Command and Control
If the C2 process Is indeed a continuum of the decision and
execution functions fused Into a single dynamic like flying an
airplane, then It is necessary to have a firm grasp of aim of the
process. To study execution and its tlmel I ness takes a general
statement of purpose of command and control.
The first question for the science of C2 should be: What is the
substantive (not procedural) aim or purpose of command? We have
seen that C2 creates (activates) combat power. The operational
aim of Command Is to be able to d I str I bute that power:
o spat I a I I
y
o tempore I I
o f unct I ona I I
y
to achieve a goal , and when In combat to carry out a mission.
By spatially Is meant the positioning of blocks of forces at a
certain place. By temporally Is meant the positioning of forces
In a certain time or sequence. By functionally Is meant
assigning forces to do certain things, very similar to the
operational term, a tasking. The result of a wise C2 process is
a proper distribution or allocation of combat power against the
observed or anticipated distribution of the enemy's power.
Let us look at the hierarchy of combat goals. At its most
succinct the purpose of combat is to achieve a mission. Implicit
in the superior commander's assignment of a mission is an
estimate of the combat power that the executing commander will
generate and distribute in the face of a specific threat
(mentally conceived by the tasking commander as opposing combat
power) in a conjectured environment. A pertinent, and sometimes
underplayed, Influence on the level of combat power the executing
commander will be able to generate is any constraints ("rules of
engagement") Imposed by the tasking commander. Also Implicit is
a value of the mission objective In the superior commander's
mi nd .
Second in the hierarchy of combat goals is this. Only rarely is
the mission to be accompl Ished "at al I costs". If It Is, the
mission statement will likely say so; If It is not, then "at
reasonable costs" Is Implicit. Does the executing commander
have any guide to what cost is reasonable? In practice the
personality of the tasking commander Is probably the best guide.
In principle, or in the Judgment of posterity, a suitable guide
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Is a comparison of the net change In combat potentiality of the
two sides at the end of the battle.
Let us say the combat potential of forces of an attacker we will
call A Is 100 units, and that an estimate cf A's realizable
combat power Is 100 units per day. A's mission Is to cross a
river and establish a brldgeheed. The potential of the defender,
D, Is 25 units, but when postured behind the river, D's combat
power Is 75 units per day. The superior commander orders A to
attack because In his mind's eye after A has achieved the opposed
crossing, D will retreat and only be able to generate combat
power of at most 25 units per day. He envisions a loss of A's
potential of 10 to 15X during the assault, so that mission
accomplishment will net him a final potential of 85 to 90 units
against less than 25 for the enemy, who will have lost the
Important strength of his position behind the river.
The bridge is assaulted and taken. Because of a stubborn
defense, A suffers severe losses, and his combat potential for
pursuit of D Is reduced to 60 units. D's losses were I ight and
his potential is still 25 units, but as expected, his available
combat power is now only 25 units per day. Faced by 60 units of
A, he must retreat unti I he can establ Ish a new defensive
position that promotes his potential sufficiently to defend
against A. The tasking commander may be satisfied, despite A's
losses, for another reason. If A goes over to the defense, his
fighting strength is enhanced by his new position, and Is worth,
say, 160 units per day of combat power against an enemy assault.
In such a way as this can the reasonableness of losses be put In
mission perspective. An old question that haunts commanders,
military historians, and analysts alike has to do with the
peripherals: put aside the present postures for a moment and
take the longer view. A's potential was reduced from 100 to 60
units. D's potential remained constant at 25. From a
strategist's point of view, did his tactical commander achieve a
Pyrrhic victory? Take another viewpoint. With fewer losses
could the river have been crossed upstream or down by deception
and surprise? The question of where to draw a I I ne around the
causes and effects of combat has been called the teleological
problem [Thomas, 1984, pp. 303-306]. Such Issues are far more
Important than whether the precise assessment of combat potential
of A should have been 90, 100, or 110 units. The right strategy
and the right tactics are more Important than exactly the right
numbers
.
Therefore we will do well to consider, third in the hierarchy of
combat goals, mission accompl Ishment In terms of means and ends.
As In most combat theory, doml nat I on is the fundamental means.
#
^Control and influence are alternative terms used. The stronger
term doml nat Ion seems most fitting with regard to tactics and the
battlefield, and the weaker terms control or Influence more
fitting for strategy and policy.
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The object of combat Is to dominate the enemy (to some end
called the mission) and a commander searches for combat
processes which will dominate him. Attrition is one way, but so
are suppression, surprise, and maneuver to a superior position.
Giving domination the primacy It deserves helps in the search for
ways to avoid the casualties of a frontal assault.
Fourth and last in the hierarchy of goals, we return now to the
general decision of command: how to distribute combat power with
domination in mind. When battle is imminent a commander seeks
to activate his forces to achieve their greatest potential over
the course of it. On the eve of battle he distributes his
potential in blocks, the combat power of which threaten to
dominate the enemy to greatest effect. The ultimate source of
combat power is blocks of we I I -pos 1 1 I oned and directed lethality,
but even when the lethal substance Is firepower It may be
lethal I ty in the offing, created by maneuver. In one paradigm,
effective Force against the enemy Is a combination of fire and
movement. We wish to emphasize that effective Force must be
measured In a richer way than the number of casualties Inflicted.
It Is not necessary to abandon the be I ief that the threat of
destruction lies behind all success on the battlefield to believe
that actual destruction Is not always necessary to achieve a
mission. That is the warp and woof of Sun Tzu's wisdom In
"Offensive Strategy", Chapter III of The Art of War [1963]. The
enemy defender may be suppressed, outmaneuvered , surprised,
dlsspirlted, and by some such cause be literally "forced" back,
forced to surrender, or In another fashion be bent to the will of
the attacker
.
Thus Is expressed the notion of dominating the enemy to achieve
the mission by the effective app
I
Icatlon of Force represented in
a quantity of combat power that is drawn from the commander's
combat potential.
Here is an example of distributed combat power: "C2 planning
must deal with tactical content (the desired state). Let us
explore this important point. One style of ground attack is to
direct operations along a front by specifying for each force
element a geographical objective, its desired state. [See Figure
2]. Reinforcements are then sent to the places where operations
are experiencing the greatest difficulty. Success is viewed as
the simultaneous attainment of all objectives. In this case,
victory depends on the absence of exposed flanks. A second,
contrary style is to strengthen places along the front where
operations are succeeding, reinforcing success with the object of
snowballing It. [See Figure 3]. In this case, victory depends
on a breakthrough followed by exploitation. In naval operations,
the successful defense of a battle group depends on the timely
augmentation of AAW, ASUW, or ASW forces when necessary to handle
air, surface, or subsurface attacks. In strike operations one
virtue of naval mobility Is the threat of attack and the
exploitation of enemy vulnerability whereever it Is found."












REINFORCEMENTS ARE SENT TO THE COMPANY ON THE RIGHT
FLANK WHICH IS HAVING DIFFICULTY REACHING
ITS OBJECTIVE
FIGURE 3
REINFORCEMENTS ARE SENT TO THE LEFT FLANK TO
EXPLOIT THE OPPORTUNITY OF A BREAKTHROUGH
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The Value of Command and Control
A question of Immense practical importance Is, what is the value
of C2? In a word the issue Is, how much Inferiority In designed
combat potential (I. e., numbers) can superior C2 hope to
overcome? We have already seen that the answer is, sometimes a
great dea I
.
Often the question posed Is this: everything else being equal,
wl I I a new and powerful set of C2 hardware be worth the cost?
The reason the question Is difficult Is because the payoff Is
properly measured In combat power, or a proxy, combat potential.
Say it Is certain that with the new hardware A's decision cycle
can made faster than B's by 20% each and every time on the
battlefield. What is that worth by some combat measure of
effectiveness I ike casualty exchange rate? The new C2 system's
time advantage of 20% could be worth 20% In combat
effectiveness, or a paultry 254, or a war breaking 200%.
The answer much depends on circumstances which are difficult to
foresee when the peacetime purchase of the C2 hardware is
contemplated. There seems to be no general answer, but research
might yield some surprising insights. It Is In the historical
record that the more the commander is in control of al I combat
activities, the more difference the qual ities of the commander
and his equipment make in the outcomes. Ace fighter pilots rack
up extraordinary strings of victories in a combat lifetime.
Inexperienced fighter pilots have a very short life expectancy.
Pilots of single seat aircraft have almost total command and
control over their "forces": themselves and their machines. The
spread of results is from more than 100 victories at the top of
the scale to none at the bottom.
The record shows the spread between ace and goat submarine
skippers in sinking shipping Is also great, but not as great as
for fighter pilots. Among German U-boat commanding officers In
World War II, 1 0X of them inflicted 45% of the casualties to
allied merchant ships. At the other extreme, 46% of them hit
nothing. It is the nature of submarine combat that the
commanding officer has very tight command of his ship and orew,
though not as complete as for a pilot.
For ground operations, one historian studied the difference In
the combat effectiveness between 24 Western European divisions In
World War II. He concluded that the difference between the best
and the worst was only In the ratio of two and one-half to one.
[Oupuy: 1987, p. 116]. A commander of a division exercises C2
over thousands of men and pieces of equipment and, compared to
the air and sea examples, It Is inherently a highly distributed
contro I as we I I .
The above comparisons are not rigorously compatible. However, a
recent, well structured approach by Bolmarcich [1969] has fit the
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pilots, submarine commanding officers, and tank commanders.
Bolmarcich shows quite a tight fit of the Po
I
ya parameter (Beta),
and concludes "To our mind, It [the narrow range of derived
parameter values over all cases] points to some law of human
group behavior with a stability rivaling that of the physical
sciences." There are threads In the foregoing that ought to be
pulled together, under some such hypothesis as a Theory of the
Expert". Still, one Is left with the feeling that the potential
of C2 In general, and C2 material In particular, to Influence
outcomes will be proportionate to how directly the commander Is
able to Implement his wise or foolish decisions.
Measures of Command Effectiveness
The above discussion is a reminder that one cannot evaluate
without measures of effectiveness. Command effectiveness Is tied
to combat effectiveness. It Is not the function, command, that
Is to be measured, but the results of the process, command and
control . Some excel lent work has been done toward drawing
together the entire command and control community -- producers,
purchasers, commanders, staffs, and analysts-- to establish a
common basis for evaluation of C2 systems [see for example,
Sweet, et al.; 1986]. These efforts acknowledge the difference
between (a) measures of genuine force effectiveness (MOFEs) which
we have discussed above, (b) measures of C2 effectiveness (MOEs)
which isolate the C2 system or process, and (c) technical
measures of performance (MOPs) of C2 components. A major aim of
the science of command and control ought to be to study the
I I nkage between an MOE value (I ike the length of time to go
around the decision cycle) and the more difficult to measure MOFE
which is related to the payoff in a battle. How often is the
MOE, time to act, a satisfactory proxy for the MOFE, combat
outcome?
On the subject of effectiveness measures, John Dockery [1985] Is
at once profound and encouraging. Profound because he Insists
that MOEs require a mathematical definition that is able to
combine quantitative valuations of disparate qualities-- which
Is the case both with command and with combat results-- and he Is
so bold as to advance fuzzy sets as the way to do that.
Encouraging because he believes that when decisions are involved,
"measures are always Intended to communicate Information which
will allow a [mere] rank ordering of the conflicting goals and
desires facing an organizational decision maker." Be that as It
may, a reading of Dockery suggests thst much can be done and
needs doing. He also concludes that a measure can be defined
(said to "exist") only within some problem context. We share the
conclusion that specific problems require specific study, but In
addition believe that a sound theoretical structure will lead to
some general quantitative relationships between between better
command and better battlefield outcomes.
There Is an enormous literature devoted to every aspect of
command and control. It Includes studies of organization,
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motivation, decision making, and execution. The literature
covers the command function, the command and control process, and
command and control systems. Most of the studies applicable to
the science of combat C2 , which Is concerned with two-sided
activity In an environment charged with physical violence, are
empirical and prescriptive: they are concerned with what to do
or how to do It. By and large the missing element Is Insight
Into "If I do It, what's It worth?" as well as "What will It
cost-- in dollars, or lives, or time, or morale?" Deep as these
questions are, the understanding of command and control will not
advance far without keeping the questions at the forefront and
struggl I ng with the answers.
We began the previous section with the rhetorical question, how
much numerical Inferiority can superior C2 hope to overcome? Add
to this two more questions:
o How often will the opportunities arise?
o To what extent can the separate values of C2 , training,
quality of combat equipment, and combat experience be isolated
and measured as the explanation of a series of outcomes?
In their chapter, "The Use of Measures of Effectiveness", Morse
and Kimball (1960; pp. 45-46) posed this question and could go no
further than to encourage its study. These are the questions
this paper is Intended to help with, and to which It wants to




1. The structure over which It Is presumed that command exercises




2. A commander organizes and motivates his forces to create
combat potential. He activates his combat potential against an
enemy to create combat power
.
3. By activation is meant to cause forces to carry out specified
activities. As a result of activation, dynamic processes occur
with observable effects, which when aggregated create combat
power
.
4. The effect of side A's combat power directed against an
enemy, side B, and the enemy's measures to attenuate Its effect
when combined result In a measurable Force of A against B. Side
B simultaneously app I I es Its attenuated combat power against A.
In combination, the consequence is a f orce-on-force process
called combat, with a measurable result called an outcome.
5. Force Is a real phenomenon, comprising physical, mental, and
spiritual factors. Force always Involves, In threat or real Ity,
the del Ivery of lethal violence. The outcome of applying force
is a complex change in the attribute states of the forces. Force
Is more than a tabulation of forces and outcome Is more than
battle casualties.
6. It Is useful to distinguish:
o C2 functions: responsibilities of command; that Is, acts
or operations expected of a commander.
o C2 processes: the acts or operations that ensue when
command exercises its authority and responsibility.
o C2 system: a collection of things used to perform the C2
f unct i ons
.
7. Although C2 affects all forces under Its command and their
activities, C2 Is not the activities of those forces except when
the elements of forces belong to the C2 system and the actions
are part of the C2 process.
8. The general object of a commander is his mission. A
commander achieves his mission by applying his combat power In
such a way as to dominate his enemy. In operation, command
distributes Its power specially, temporally, and functionally.
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9. A primary problem of command la deciding how to distribute
combat power simultaneous with deciding on measures to attenuate
the enemy's combat power. Decisions are taken against thinking,
acting opposition.
10. The problem of decision Is closely associated with the
problem of execution, because the decisions must be made In time
for the forces to carry out their intended activities.
11. If the process of deciding is called command and
of executing Is called control, then the two are
Intertwined and studied as the C2 process.
the process
nextr I cab I
y
12. Two other fundamental Issues are
o The value of
force, and outcomes.
C2 and its contribution to combat power,
o Measurement of the effectiveness of C2 and the
suitability of proxies (called MOEs) as substitutes for measures
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APPENDIX A: DEFINITIONS RELATED TO COMMAND AND CONTROL
[Military] Forces: a aet of elements which when activated by a
commander will produce combat power.
Combat (process): the activities of forces in opposition which
produce results on a battlefield.
[Military] Potential: the latent capacity of forces to achieve
useful results in combat.
Designed potential: the maximum capacity evisloned; rated
capac i ty
.
Actual potential: capacity available under the circumstances.
Combat Power: the realized capability of forces at any instant
in time to achieve results in combat in furtherence of a mission.
Force: the observable effect of combat power on an enemy [in a
batt le]
.
Command: the function which organizes, motivates, makes
decisions regarding, and directs the activities of forces.
Control [when used alone]: the function that executes command
dec is I ons
.
Commander: one who commands forces.
Mission: the goal assigned to a commander toward which he
directs the activities of his forces.
Leadership: the characteristics of a commander in the execution
of command responsibilities.
Command and Control [process] (C2) : the generic name for
activities which themselves activate all elements of military
forces for (i. e., preparatory to and during) combat.
Combat Direction: the activities of the C2 process that govern
the activities of forces in combat.
Command, Control and Communications [process] (C3) : activities
of communication that are imbedded in C2
.
Command and Control System (C2 system): the elements used to
effect the C2 process.
C3 System: the elements used to communicate in the C2 process.
C2 Countermeasures (C2CM) : activities Intended to lessen the
effectiveness of the enemy's C2 process.
C2CM System: the elements used to effect the C2CM process.
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APPENDIX B: ADDITIONAL TOPICS FOR STUDY
The fol lowing topics are recommended for study within the
framework established by this research.
1. Illustrations and tests of the C2 process by means of some
basic analytical combat models, contrasting the usual attrition
form of them with the form when combat power and force are
developed. Map a program to test the models with exercises and
h Istor i ca I data
.
2. The framework should be examined for robustness and internal
consistency In a variety of combat environments:
o Static warfare, such as trench warfare
o S I ege
o Mobile warfare, such as blitzkrieg
o Naval fleet action
o Aer I a I due I
s
o A charge, such as by Infantry, cavalry or tanks, with or






The essential questions are: Is the structure sufficient? and Is
everything in the structure necessary?
3. The effect of the scale of the war on both the tactical C2
process and the system. Specifically some distinguishing
features of C2 In a crisis with I Imited or no appl icatlon of
force; In theater conventional warfare; and the tactics [sic] of
combat In global nuc I eer warfare.
4. C2 architecture Is a concept In vogue. Is there a synergistic
relationship between the applied or "engineering" science of C2
architecture and the basic science represented by this research?
6. Combat power appears in this theory In an heurlsticelly
appeal I ng way to most ml I Itary men. Physical power Is work per
unit time, or In some mechanical systems, forward thrust
30
represented as force times velocity. It Is difficult to see how
the complex combat power defined as F [ m, u J w I I I reduce to
physical power when mental and spiritual aspects are removed, but
It can be shown that combat power can be reduced to momentum, and
combat force Is the first derivative. What Is the best term for
the phenomenon we have called combat power? Combat potential as
military potential energy deserves wringing out as well.
6. The enumeration of basic trends, like the expansion of the
battlefield and the Influence of cryptana
I
ys I s , and their
probable effect on tactical C2 in future wars can and should be
examined within this framework.
7. Regarding control through organization, the tendency over the
course of battle is thought to be toward a state of chaos. The
concept has been advanced elsewhere of se I
f
-regenerat I ng nodes of
order on a battlefield to reduce entropy. Is this appl Icatlon of
Prlgogene's work a useful approach?
8. Development of the concept of Cohesion and Disjunction and
the role of command to promote the former and lessen the latter.
Cohesion and disjunction are so closely related to organization
and motivation that these C2 functions are essential to any
treeatment. The theory offers an approach by admitting the
effect of a change of attributes on the performance of human
e I ements
.
9. A thoughtful discussion of combat Doctrine, Its purposes and
limitations. Should the Ideological aspects be emphasized
(Internal effects on Individual members of a unit), or the
coord i nat i ona I aspects (the effects on the unit as a whole in
fostering cooperative effort)? Each has been stressed, but
rarely both at once.
10. investigation of areas ripe for development, like surprise
and one of Its primary sources, deception. Surprise Is
acknowledged as having a primary effect on battle outcomes, and
much of C2 Is concerned with achieving or preventing It. The
first priority should be to develop a way to examine the value
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